We analyse the extent to which managers exercise discretion under fair value accounting. Utilising a sample of firms regulated by the UK fair value pension accounting standard, (FRS-17), we examine the main determinants of the assumptions managers use to arrive at pension scheme risk and valuation. Despite little variation in the underlying economic inputs, differences in stated assumptions across companies, auditors and actuaries are significant. Managers display considerable variation in conservatism when implementing fair value accounting and this variation is determined by scheme-specific characteristics, such as asset allocation and pension solvency. Consequently, the observed inconsistency in reporting across firms brings into question the efficacy of fair value accounting for assessing corporate risk.
INTRODUCTION
Proponents of fair value accounting argue that historical cost obscures the true underlying economic position of the firm, whilst critics believe that the transitory nature of fair value injects unnecessary volatility in financial reports. Prior research has shown that market participants are unable to reach a consensus on information presented in annual reports, particularly when it is complex [Hirst (1998) ]. Similarly, pension accounting under fair value has considerable potential to remain opaque and problematic for users of financial accounts. There are two main reasons for this. First, pension accounting is, by its very nature, difficult. Any assessment of the assets and liabilities in a pension scheme requires detailed mortality calculations, forecasts on future macroeconomic conditions, and an analysis of population demographics. Second, fair value gives considerable discretion to management. The final accounting assumptions that are used in the assessment of pension risk and valuation are ultimately agreed upon by management, under the guidance of the firm's actuary and auditor and these are open to manipulation within broad confidence intervals. If there is large variation in pension assumptions across firms, fair value accounting fails in one of its key goals, namely the provision of transparent and accessible financial statements.
Recent work on pension accounting has focused on the value and credit relevance of fair value footnote disclosures under Statements of Financial Accounting Standards 87 [Hann, Heflin and Subramanyan (2007) ]. They found that fair value footnote disclosures did nothing to improve the information quality of financial reports above SFAS-87 disclosures. However, they were unable to assess how management implement fair value when there needs to be full recognition in the balance sheet.
The ongoing debate in the U.S. about the introduction of fair value accounting for pensions, and whether it is appropriate, is one of the key issues for future accounting standard development. A number of researchers have tried to assess the potential impact of such a move [Hann et al. (2007) ]. However, the U.S. has yet to adopt such a system, although it has recently moved a little closer with the introduction of Financial Accounting Standard 158 . Analysing FAS-158, Grant, Grant and Ortega (2007) reported that the setting of aggressive assumptions still exists, although almost all the fair value disclosure appears only in the footnotes to accounts.
The U.K. introduced fair value pension accounting in 2001 with Financial
Reporting Standard 17 . It therefore presents a unique opportunity to analyse how fair value has been implemented in practice. This setting is important for two reasons. First, it is the largest available sample of fair value pension accounting disclosures in existence. Second, a longer time period allows for an analysis under changing economic circumstances, such as changes in bond yields and falling equity values, which have a significant impact upon the value and risk of pension schemes.
We make three main contributions to the literature. First, we document the variation in assumptions that management apply when accounting for pensions under fair value. One of the fundamental reasons for adopting fair value is to make the information in financial accounts consistent and representative across firms a . If there is significant variation in disclosure across firms, this calls into question the underlying motivation for adopting fair value.
Our second contribution is to analyse the impact of auditor and actuary on managerial discretion. One of the novel characteristics of our sample is that we analyse the biggest corporations in the U.K., who are mainly audited by the big four accountancy firms, and advised by the largest actuaries. We investigate whether the variation in assumptions across firms can be attributed to either of these external groups. Since accounting and auditing firms are likely to have similar technologies, the adoption of a 'house view' on a given assumption seems reasonable. Conversely, if there is considerable variation across auditor and/or actuary, this is suggestive that assumption setting is driven by potential conflicts of interest such as fees, company size or scheme size.
Our final contribution examines the determinants of both managerial choice and conservatism in accounting for pensions. The assumptions that management adopt may be driven by a number of scheme-based and/or firm characteristics. Prior research has found strong links between the percentage of pension assets held in equity, the expected return on plan assets and corporate events [Bergstresser et al (2006) ]. Our analysis examines the determinants of assumption choice in accounting for pensions, as well as, for the first time, the determinants of managerial conservatism under fair value.
a Accounting Standards Board (2001) Our results are as follows. We document that the difference in underlying pension assumptions across firms is substantial. Given that the expected return on pension equity and the discount rate for calculating the present value of the pension liability b are common to all companies, we would expect to see little variation in the level of these assumptions; however this is contrary to what is actually observed. Moreover, these differences are not related to the identity of a firm's actuary or auditor.
Secondly, the level of fees paid to the auditor influences the assumptions that firms adopt. Those companies that apply the most favourable assumptions pay significantly higher audit fees. In relation to the implementation of fair value accounting, the observed variation in assumptions obscures the underlying economic reality of corporate pension schemes. Our results show that although favourable assumptions are clearly observable, they are accepted by the firm's auditor. As a result, the opacity of pension accounting has not diminished under fair value.
We find that the most favourable assumptions are given to firms that have the greatest influence and bargaining power over their actuary. We proxy this conflict with the size of the pension scheme relative to the total assets of the firm c . Our analysis shows that where the pension liability is large relative to the total assets of the firm, the actuary will apply the most favourable accounting assumptions. As with a company's auditor, the potential influence over the advisor to the firm reduces the transparency of the accounting standard.
Finally, it is clear that there are different objectives for management depending on the solvency of the pension scheme. Companies with the greatest level of funding have the highest discount rates and discount rate spread assumptions. We also find that firms with large pension scheme deficits relative to the size of the firm will tend to choose a higher equity return and equity spread assumption. In this case, management appear to choose assumptions that maximise the level of financial income that can be derived from pension scheme assets.
b The expected return on equity is the return on the equity component of pension assets. Under FRS-17 the discount rate is the yield on an AA corporate bond of suitable maturity. c We assume that a large pension scheme relative to the size of the firm proxies for a greater amount of business for the actuary as small schemes require less administration.
In the next section, Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS-17) is described in detail. In section II, we develop the motivation and hypotheses that are tested in the paper. Section III presents the data and methodology. Section IV discusses the empirical results and Section V concludes.
FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARD 17
The introduction of FRS-17 in the UK has fundamentally changed how firms account for defined benefit pension schemes. was a watershed in accounting for pensions in the UK. For the first time, firms had to apply fair value in accounting for their pensions within a much more rigorous framework than under any previous standard.
The framework for FRS-17 can be split into two broad categories: methodological and information disclosure. Unlike previous standards, which allowed the actuary/management to select the actuarial method of liability calculation, e FRS-17 specifies that liabilities must be calculated using the projected unit method. f This is an accrued benefits valuation model, which takes account of the rights to benefits earned by scheme members up to the valuation point, allowing for future increases in the level of pensionable salaries and the value of pensions in payment.
The standard also sets out the appropriate discount rate that must be applied when calculating the present value of the pension liability, where the discount rate must reflect both the time value of money and duration of the pension liability. The ASB states that the yield on a high quality AA rated bond or a bond of equivalent status is the appropriate and 'other'. 'Other' assets are generally cash and annuities, although some firms also hold insurance contracts or small exposures to managed funds. With the disclosure of the fair value of the assets held in the scheme, the expected rate of return on the different asset classes is also presented. Although the expected return assumption does not effect the asset valuation since assets are marked-to-market, it does contribute to the amount that is recognised in the profit and loss account.
In addition to the different assumptions, a detailed disclosure of the costs of the defined benefit scheme is provided. These disclosures are material and charged against operating profit. FRS-17 requires that the current service cost, past service cost, actuarial gains and losses (including the difference between the actual and expected return on scheme assets), and any historical adjustments to pension costs as a result of changes in the level of benefit provision are disclosed.
The final disclosure is the difference between the assets and the liabilities of the scheme on the balance sheet of the firm. Where the fair value of assets exceeds the present value of the pension liability, the scheme is declared to be in surplus and an asset should appear on the balance sheet. Conversely, where the value of scheme assets are less than the present value of the pension liability, a liability will appear on the balance sheet. Two stylized examples are presented to illustrate the interactions between different pension components and how management can manipulate the assumptions to impact upon the size of the liability faced by the firm and the income it can derive from the pension scheme assets.
Liability Manipulations
Assume that a firm has a pension liability of £1bn. After one year's accrual of benefits, the pension liability that is owed by the firm is likely to have increased due to an increase in employee wages. Assume that the future value of this payment is £100m i . To calculate the increase in the present value of the pension liability, the £100m in new benefits will have to be discounted back to today. If the management of the firm choose to apply a higher discount rate, the increase in the present value of the liability will be less. Consequently, the change in the liability from one year to the next will be underestimated in the annual report.
Bozewicz (2004) and,
i Although we only focus on wage growth, the increase of the pension liability will be a function of pension growth, inflation wage growth and changes to the level of benefits provided. The assumed increase in wages however, is by far the biggest driver of increases in the liability owed by the firm.
-4∆= (-4 The 0.5% change in the discount rate has therefore reduced the pension liability by 12%.
Profit and Loss Manipulations
Firms also have considerable scope to manipulate the pension assets for crediting the profit and loss account under other financial income. We now assume that a firm pension is 100% invested in equity with a liability of £100m and assets of £80m, thus having a £20m deficit. Further, the discount rate is assumed to be 5% and the expected return on equity 10%. From one year's unwinding of the scheme, the interest cost will be £5m (5% discount rate multiplied by the pension liability). The expected return on plan assets in the same year will be £8m (from the 10% return on plan assets). In reconciling this to the profit and loss statement, there would be an interest charge of (£5m) and a financial income credit of £8m. The profit and loss will therefore be credited with a net income of £3m. Consequently where the difference between the discount rate and the expected return on plan assets is higher then firms can credit the profit and loss with more income from the pension assets.
MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES
In the U.S., the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 87 (SFAS-87) has come under increasing criticism and pressure from regulators and industry amid calls for a stronger move towards fair value pension accounting. The Chartered Financial
Analysts Institute has stated that the current method of accounting (under SFAS-87)
"imposes a huge and costly burden" on the users of financial accounts. The U.S. Senate
Finance Committee has also threatened legislation that would remove the complex smoothing mechanism of actuarial gains and losses under SFAS-87.
In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concluded that balance sheets are "often not transparent as to the true funded status of pension plans" j leading to calls that pension accounting should be reformed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In response, the FASB proposed a two-stage process to reform pension accounting, the first part of which was the introduction of FAS-158. Phase one came into effect for fiscal year ends after December 15, 2006. Phase two is predicted to be much more significant and wide ranging. One of the most controversial aspects of this second phase may be the removal of the SFAS-87 smoothing mechanism altogether [Hann et al (2007) ].
Underpinning the proposed fair value solution is the notion that fair value accounting will improve the reporting quality of financial accounts. If this is true, it is to be expected that profit and loss statements will become more meaningful, transparent and comparable. However, the perceived benefits of fair value in theory and its application in practice may differ considerably. Unlike Hann et al (2007) we do not attempt to analyse the value and credit relevance of the fair value recognition of pension assets and liabilities. Rather, we look at whether the assumptions underlying the calculation of the different pension components are consistent and unbiased across firms. Where this is so, the application of fair value would address some of the concerns about current methods of pension accounting.
H1: The choice of accounting assumptions by management is consistent and unbiased across firms.
Another facet of consistency in reporting is the relationship that different advisors and/or external bodies have with the firm. In looking at the administration of pension schemes, firms employ actuaries to give advice on their scheme and auditors to provide an objective assessment of the quality of their financial reports. In this case it is possible that any patterns observed in the cross-section of assumptions are a function of who advises the firm, since different advisors may hold 'house views' on the various assumptions. Similarly, it is also possible for the auditor of a firm to be an explanatory j SEC (2005) factor in the different assumptions that are passed. To this end, the auditor may hold a 'house view' on what assumptions are acceptable and represent a fair and true view of a firm's pension liability.
H2a: Pension assumptions are not biased across actuary groupings.
H2b: Pension assumptions are not biased across auditor groupings.
There are a number of potential conflicts between the actuary, auditor and the firm. For the auditor, the most obvious conflict is the level of audit fees paid by the firm.
The literature on whether these relationships hold in practice generally shows that fee dependence does not impact upon the independence of the auditor when issuing a qualified or unqualified opinion. [Craswell, Stokes and Laughton (2002) ]. However, these studies consider the aggregate passing of the annual report rather than specific areas of financial reporting. Again, in looking at the actuary of the firm, there is a potential conflict between the size of the pension scheme being administered and the assumptions that are passed k .
H3: Pension scheme assumptions are not determined by firm or scheme specific characteristics.
Despite the prescriptive nature of how the pension liability and present value of this liability are calculated under FRS-17, management still have considerable latitude in the underlying assumptions that are applied. Bergstresser et al (2006) focus on the sensitivity of firm earnings to the expected return on pension plan assets. Their results
show that where firm income is sensitive to the expected return on pension assets, management are more likely to choose higher expected return assumptions. Further, where pension assets are large, the management may adopt more favourable return k As mentioned previously we use the size of the scheme relative to the size of the firm as a proxy for the amount of business for the actuary as small schemes require less administration.
assumptions. Their results also show that the adoption of such favourable assumptions is linked to corporate events such as earnings announcements and the exercise of options.
In looking at the asset composition of UK pension portfolios it is clear that equity is the most significant asset class. Despite the tax advantages of holding large amounts of bonds in pension assets, [Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) ] the average pension portfolio in 2001 consisted of 70% equity, 25% bonds and 5% other assets,. This however, is crucial in determining where managers have scope for manipulating income from pension assets. First, the expected return on equity is the most subjective of all the disclosed assumptions and management can assume a considerably higher rate of return here than on any other asset. Consequently, if management wish to obtain income for the profit and loss statement from pension assets then they would hold larger amounts of equity in the pension portfolio.
H4: The expected return on equity is not related to the value of equity held in pension assets
In the U.S. there has been little scope for selecting a favourable discount rate.
Since 1993, the discount rate has been based upon Moody's Aa interest rate index l . As a result, previous studies have not considered the determinants of the choice of discount rate. However, recent legislation, passed in 2004, now allows firms to apply the yield on a portfolio of long-dated corporate bonds as the discount rate for the pension liability. In doing so, there is greater potential for selectivity in the discount rate of the firm in the future.
The example, in section one highlights how sensitive the pension liability is to small changes in the discount rate. Under FRS-17, management have greater discretion over the discount rate. From this, a number of insights can be gained into the behaviour of management in exercising this discretion. There may be a number of motivations that determine how management behave in this situation. Consequently, we derive a number l In 1993, the SEC's Chief Accountant ruled that this was the appropriate discount rate for calculating the present value of a firm's pension liability.
of competing hypotheses to test what factors influence management's choice of discount rate.
The first hypothesis is the null that there is no relationship between the chosen discount rate and pension scheme characteristics. If this is the case, management are applying fair value accounting within the spirit of the standard. Under FRS-17 the benchmark discount rate is the yield on a AA corporate bond, it therefore may also be the case that this restriction is successful in limiting the behaviour of management in this situation.
H5a: There is no relationship between the choice of discount rate and pension scheme characteristics.
However, there are also a number of other potential outcomes. First, the firm would be perceived to be bearing significant risk when the pension liability is large relative to the size of the firm. In response, management may elect to apply a higher discount rate than other firms to reduce the perceived risk of the firm.
H5b: Those firms with the largest pension liability select the largest discount rate
Conversely it could also be that the management of the firm choose to adopt a higher discount rate in circumstances where the pension liability is small relative to the firm. Over time, management may therefore systematically understate the liability of the scheme so that it does not increase the perceived risk of the firm.
H5c: Those firms with the smallest pension liability select the largest discount rate
Last, management may be concerned with the level of funding in the pension scheme. The funding level of a pension scheme is the figure that is regularly quoted in the financial press. Although this is unrelated to the size of the firm, it is a significant variable since it measures the solvency of the pension scheme. Scheme funding is a function of both the increases in the pension liability and the fair value of the assets held to meet the pension liability. Where there are large fluctuations in asset values, a scheme will appear to have a volatile funding level m . Management may therefore choose to apply a higher discount in this situation to present a 'stable' funding ratio in the annual report.
H5d: The choice of discount rate is determined by the solvency of the pension scheme
Our analysis is also driven by a methodological refinement. Prior studies have considered the absolute assumptions that are presented in the annual report. However, as the example in section one illustrated, the true impact of the expected return on equity or the discount rate does not come from the absolute value, but from their relationship with other assumptions.
If managers attempt to minimise the pension liability, the difference between wage growth and the discount rate becomes important. Where the spread between the discount rate and wage growth is high, management are only increasing the present value of the pension liability by a small amount and discounting the liability more steeply, as shown in section one.
From these spread variables, we proxy managerial conservatism. If assumption spreads are large, management are not applying prudent assumptions in accounting for their pension schemes. If we observe considerable variation in managerial conservatism this will undermine the usefulness of fair value accounting since the economic reality of the true position of the firm will be obscured. As this is the first analysis to consider managerial conservatism, we have a number of competing hypotheses that follow the motivations for the choice of discount rate, as differing levels of conservatism would be driven by similar factors. Where management wish to credit the profit and loss with financial income from the pension assets, this must be net of the interest cost of the pension scheme. The spread between the expected return on assets and the discount rate therefore measures the 'true' manipulation that occurs. When the spread is large, the firm incurs a low interest charge from applying a low discount rate thereby increasing the return generated from plan assets that can be credited to the profit and loss account n . As noted above, when the equity component of pension assets is large, management have the greatest potential to derive income from the pension scheme in this way.
H7: There is no relationship between managerial profit and loss conservatism and the
value of the pension scheme assets.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our analysis employs two main data sources. Individual pension data is directly collected from FRS-17 disclosures in the financial reports of sample companies. For all other data we use Worldscope. From the FRS-17 disclosures, we collected the value of pension assets and liabilities, the value of the individual asset classes, the expected return assumptions and the valuation assumptions. From Worldscope, we collected the year-end firm market value, total assets, total debt, and the book value of equity. , not all firms immediately adopted the standard with its requisite disclosure rules.
In addition, over the sample period a number of firms merged or de-listed. Our final sample therefore ranges from 206 to 232 companies in each year giving a total of 876 firm years.
A number of different variables are created to characterize the pension scheme.
We construct two variables that proxy for scheme size through scaling the total pension liability by total assets and by market value. The solvency of the pension scheme is defined in several ways. First, we calculate the absolute solvency of the scheme by combining total pension assets and pension liabilities. Where pension assets are greater than/(less than) the pension liability, the scheme is in surplus/(deficit). The gross surplus/(deficit) is scaled by both market value and total assets. In addition, we calculate the funding ratio of the scheme -the ratio of plan assets to plan liabilities.
In our analysis we only consider the equity component of plan assets. This decision is based upon the work of Bergstresser (2006) who finds that the expected return on plan assets and the equity component of the pension assets is significant for deriving financial income from pension assets. This is also intuitive due to the composition of pension assets in UK pension schemes o . It follows, therefore, that if management are going to derive a large amount of financial income from its assumption manipulations, the equity component is the most significant as it is the largest asset in the portfolio.
Further, it will also afford management the greatest latitude in choosing a high expected rate of return. We therefore characterize scheme assets by calculating the equity percentage of scheme assets.
In addition, all pension assumptions are standardized to unit normal in order to remove any biases that may occur due to time-varying factors such as changes in the AA bond yield from year to year. For each assumption we calculate; o U.S. pension schemes are of a similar composition to UK schemes and on average hold large amounts of equity. The mean funding level in 2001 was 97% with a median of 94%. As with the size of the pension liability, the minimum funding level is significantly different from the average at 61%. To put this into context, the surplus to total assets serves as a more useful illustration of the problem. Where a scheme is 61% funded it appears to be at risk, however, it is only at risk when the shortfall in assets is large relative to the firm. In looking at the surplus to total assets, on average, pension deficits were 1.00% of total assets. However, by 2004 the mean had increased to 5.00% of total assets. From this it is clear that under fair value the pension exposures of UK firms are significant.
An analysis of the range of assumptions gives some insight into managerial conservatism in pension accounting. For the discount rate the median rate was 6.00%.
The range was 1.75%, with a minimum of 5.50% and a maximum of 7.25%. It should be noted that the inter-quartile range is only 20 basis points and so firms tend to select the discount rate in a broadly similar way. However, the real driver for manipulating the size p A former government owned utility. of the liability is the spread between the discount rate and wage growth. Here, the range (from 0.20% to 7.25%) and the inter-quartile range (50 basis points) are large. Certain firms clearly discount their liability more, which suggests that companies assign different present value figures to the pension obligation to employees with equivalent salary and tenure.
As highlighted by Bergstresser et al (2006) , the return assumptions applied by management are highly subjective. In looking at the composition of the equity held in these pension funds it is reasonable to assume that they hold the market portfolio q . As a result, we would not expect to see considerable variation in the expected return on equity.
From the table it can be seen that the median equity return assumption is 7.25% and the mean is 7.69%. The magnitude of the range however, is substantial from 6.12% to 9.00%. Further, the underlying ability to manipulate the profit and loss comes from the equity return spread. Again the range here is considerable from 0.20% to 3.00% and the inter-quartile range is also the same for both the expected return on equity and the equity spread at 70 basis points.
RESULTS
In this section, we explicitly test the hypotheses developed in the paper. Section 4.1 discusses firm-level variation in pension assumptions. Section 4.2 examines the role of the auditor and actuary in assumption formation and Section 4.3 analyses the relationship between firm and pension scheme characteristics and the stated assumptions across auditors and actuaries. Lastly, in section 4.4 we analyse the determinants of managerial choice and conservatism across firms.
VARIATION IN ASSUMPTIONS ACROSS FIRMS
Our first hypothesis relates to the consistency and unbiasedness of pension assumptions. Where fair value is adopted consistently and in an unbiased way by management, there will be little variation in the underlying pension assumptions and q This assertion comes from talking to both actuaries and fund managers about the composition of assets in defined benefit pension schemes of large UK corporations. these will centre on the mean economic fundamentals on which the assumptions are based. The variation we see across assumptions is considerable.
The results in Table 1a show that firms select discount rates in a broadly similar way. Although, as noted above, this may be due to the restrictions (AA bond yield) placed on firms with respect to this variable. However, the discount rate although important, is much more significant when it interacts with other assumptions for manipulating the profit and loss and/or balance sheet.
In looking at both the equity return spread and the discount rate spread we find that the inter-quartile ranges are large. For the discount rate this implies that certain firms are understating their pension liability. While for the expected return on equity, certain firms are choosing assumptions that allow for a greater level of income to be credited to the profit and loss. Table 2 presents results from inference tests on the difference between the stated assumptions that are used to impute pension valuations and expected assumptions based on the economic fundamentals. Management have scope to apply an assumption within an accepted range based on the variation in the underlying economic fundamentals over the previous year. If assumptions are unbiased, the mean stated assumption should be equal to the mean historical average of the economic fundamental. It is clear from Table   2 that pension assumptions are chosen to maximise the surplus or minimise the pension liability. For each assumption, there are statistically significant differences between the expected value and the mean value that is used in the financial accounts. When considered jointly, the observed variation, and the differences between expected values and actual values, raises serious questions about the adoption of fair value in practice, since management are clearly exercising a high degree of selectivity in arriving at their chosen assumptions.
ANALYSIS OF AUDITORS AND ACTUARIES
It is possible that certain auditors or actuaries are instrumental in the setting of pension assumptions that are significantly different from the historical average, while other auditors and actuaries utilise unbiased assumptions. If only a subset of auditors or actuaries are partaking the in management of assumptions, we would expect to see a proportion of the sample classified by auditor and actuary having assumptions that are not significantly different from the historical average. Table 3 presents the results of inference tests of differences between stated assumptions and unbiased historical average economic fundamentals. There is striking consistency in the degree to which assumptions deviate from historical averages across both auditor and actuary groupings. Within both actuary and auditor groupings, Pension accounting assumptions are at the extreme end of the allowable historical ranges.
Taking the discount rate first, the average historical yield on a AA corporate bond was 5.48%. Irrespective of the auditor or actuary identities, the actual assumptions that were used on average were at the higher end of the variation in AA bond yields. Similar results apply to the other four assumptions. Every auditor and actuary has used biased assumptions in their pension accounting. Thus, we are able to reject our null hypotheses that the pension assumptions of actuaries and auditors are unbiased.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PENSION ASSUMPTIONS BY AUDITORS AND ACTUARY
In this section we investigate hypothesis 3 -that the cross-section of assumptions for each auditor and actuary are unrelated to firm and pension scheme characteristics. To analyse the way in which assumptions are set, a number of linear regressions are carried out on the main pension assumptions using alternative specifications of firm and pension scheme characteristics. All models include auditor and actuary-by-year fixed effects. The firm characteristics are size (log market value), book-to-market (BTM) and debt-to-equity (D/E). The pension characteristics are the pension liability scaled by total assets (LTA), the funding ratio (funding) and the equity percentage of pension assets (Equity). Table 4 presents the results of the fixed effect regressions r . The first regression analyses the determinants of the discount rate. We find that for the discount rate the only significant firm characteristic is the debt-to-equity ratio. Where firms are highly leveraged then a larger discount rate is applied. Interestingly the discount rate is unrelated to any pension characteristics. Discount rates are broadly being set in an unbiased manner across both auditors and actuaries as the discount rate is unrelated to any scheme characteristics. This is finding consistent with our descriptive analysis. One reason for this may be that the discount rate is set with reference to the AA bond yield and is therefore restricted in this respect.
In addition to this our analysis of the discount rate spread confirms that those firms that have the highest levels of gearing are being allowed to adopt assumptions that understate the true size of their pension liability. We also find that where the liability is large relative to the firm and the pension assets are invested in volatile securities then the spread is significantly larger. As a result where information about the risk of the pension scheme is most necessary i.e. where it poses a substantial risk to the firm. Both the auditor and actuary are allowing for these firms to understate the 'true' risk of the pension scheme.
Our analysis of the interactions between assumptions shows that across auditors and actuaries, large firms apply a higher expected return on equity and a larger equity spread. The auditor and actuary, therefore, appear to be accepting of large firms deriving a higher level of financial income from pension assets.
In analysing characteristics across auditors and actuaries our results show that the amount of equity held in the pension portfolio is positively related to the equity return assumptions. Further, where the scheme is large then higher expected return assumptions are being applied.
Another important part of assessing how fair value is implemented in practice is the potential for conflicts of interest. For the auditor we performed an auditor-by-year fixed effects regression s following the same specification as above but included the (log)
r In all the regressions we use standardized assumptions as the dependant variable. The standardization process is discussed in the data section. s The results of the auditor-by-year fixed effects regression is not presented here but the results are available from the authors on request.
total audit fees paid by the firms as an explanatory variable. The results show that across all of the assumptions where firms are paying higher audit fees then they are adopting the most favourable assumptions.
Looking at the results collectively we have to reject our null for hypothesis 3 that across auditors and actuaries assumptions set without reference to firm or scheme characteristics. Our results suggest that, across firms, the most flattering assumptions occur where the scheme poses the highest risk to the firm. That is, where the firm is highly leveraged, the scheme is large relative to the assets of the firm and the pension portfolio is invested in risky/volatile assets (equity). Further, the auditor and actuary are accepting of larger firms applying a higher equity spread and a lower discount rate spread. Consequently, these firms will incur a lower interest charge, and thus can credit the profit and loss with a higher level of financial income. Finally, there is a clear relationship between the level of fees paid to the auditor and the most favourable assumptions.
CROSS-SECTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF PENSION ASSUMPTIONS ACROSS FIRMS
The final part of our analysis looks at the determinants of managerial choice and conservatism in adopting fair value accounting. As before, we report the results of linear regressions of assumptions on alternative specifications of firm and pension scheme characteristics. All specifications include firm-by-year fixed effects. The firm characteristics remain the same as before. We do however add an additional proxy for funding relative to firm size by scaling the gross surplus/(deficit) by total assets (STA)
The descriptive analysis showed that there is little consistency in the assumptions that management adopt when accounting for their pension schemes. The previous analysis has also shown that these differences are unrelated to the firm auditor or actuary.
We therefore analyse the different factors that may influence the choices that management make.
Hypothesis 4 considers the ability of managers to derive income from the pension scheme assets. The work of Bergstresser et al (2006) finds strong results for management deriving income from pension assets based upon subjective assumed returns, pension portfolio composition and corporate events. Where management derive large amounts of financial income to credit the profit and loss then the meaningfulness of financial reports is reduced as investors cannot estimate the true profitability of the firm. Table 5 , column 1, presents our analysis of the expected return of equity assumption. The results on portfolio composition are consistent with the work of Bergstresser et al (2006) and so where equity is the largest component of the pension portfolio the assumed return on equity is higher. We therefore reject our null that portfolio composition and expected return assumptions are unrelated.
For the discount rate analysis we posited a number of competing hypotheses. Our findings reject our null and support the alternative hypothesis H5d, that firms select the discount rate on the basis of scheme solvency. Column 2 of table 5 presents the analysis of the discount rate. We find that those firms that have the highest funding ratio of pension assets to liabilities are applying higher discount rates. For managers the size of the pension liability relative to the firm is not a significant determinant of the discount rate. Further the size of the surplus/deficit is insignificant u . This is interesting as it suggests that management are concerned only about the perceived solvency of their pension scheme.
Our funding variable is commonly reported in the financial press, and as such will impact upon the markets perception of firm risk. Another reason why this may occur is that well funded schemes may be concerned about transitory fluctuations in the solvency of the pension scheme. As a result the selection of a larger discount rate will understate the 'true' liability and will reduce the impact of large asset fluctuations.
In addition to this, we examine the level of managerial conservatism that is applied in calculating the present value of the pension liability under hypothesis 6. The selection of a high discount rate is not sufficient to minimise the pension liability. Our This supports the results in column (2) that managers are concerned about perceived risk of the firm. As a result they choose assumptions that understate the liability of the firm. This again supports our assertion that fair value has not improved the transparency of balance sheets as management are systematically understating their pension liability. In doing so they are reducing the perceived risk of the firm.
The final part of our analysis looks at the ability of management to derive income from the pension assets by employing a large equity spread. In column (1) of table 5 our analysis on scheme funding and the surplus/(deficit) to total assets at first appear to be at odds as those schemes that have high funding and those schemes that have large deficits relative to firm size both adopt higher expected return assumptions. However, when the spread between the expected and return on equity analysis is considered in conjunction with the expected return analysis in column 1, then the result becomes more intuitive. In the final column of table 5 it can be seen that for the spread variable then funding becomes insignificant.
This is important as we find that across management there are two different objectives. For those schemes that are well funded then management are concerned about the perceived risk and solvency of the pension scheme. Where they adopt a higher discount rate and discount rate spread then they will incur a high interest cost. To offset this interest cost the management then assume a higher expected return to offset the cost.
This will minimise any resulting charge against profits.
Conversely, where schemes have significant solvency concerns, the management do not elect to manipulate the size of the liability/deficit. Instead they choose to maximise the financial income that can be derived for the profit and loss from the assets of the pension scheme. They therefore adopt lower discount rates, higher expected returns on equity, thereby maximising the equity return spread.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper is the first to consider the impact of managerial discretion and fair value accounting. We consider whether the adoption of fair value will address many of the concerns that have been voiced about current methods of pension accounting. Using a unique sample of fair value pension disclosures from the new UK fair value pension accounting standard FRS-17 we analyse the way in which fair value has been adopted by firms in practice. First our results show that the variation in the underlying assumptions for the pension scheme across firms is considerable. This in itself brings into question the suitability of fair value as method of accounting for pensions as financial accounts will remain opaque where management are not reporting consistently across firms.
Second we also find that the assumptions that are presented in the financial accounts cannot be attributed to either the auditor or the actuary of the firm. The different assumptions across auditor and actuary are determined by a range of firm and pension scheme characteristics. Most concerning about this is that we find that where pension risks are large then the most favourable assumptions are being adopted. Our analysis also shows that conflicts of interest in these circumstances are significant as auditors pass the most favourable assumptions where the level of total audit fees paid are high. For the actuary we also find that potential conflicts of interest determine what assumptions firms adopt.
Last we consider the determinants of managerial discretion. Our results show that management adopt different assumptions in response to the solvency of the pension scheme. Where scheme solvency is high, management choose to apply higher discount rates. Further where scheme solvency is high management apply less conservative methods of estimating the pension liability. In this case they systematically understate the liability. Conversely, where schemes have large deficits relative to the firm managers choose to derive a larger amount of financial income from the assets in the pension scheme. Here management apply the least prudent return assumptions and thereby increase the profit of the firm.
Bringing all of these results together we find that the case for adopting fair value accounting is questionable. Advocates of fair value accounting believe that it will make financial accounts more representative of the true economic position of the firm.
However, our results show that where management have discretion over how the standard is applied, financial accounts remain opaque. measured by the log market value the market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity/book value of equity, debt-to-equity is total debt/market value of equity, total audit fees is the log of total audit. The pension variables are the liability/total assets, funding, measured by pension assets/pension liabilities and the equity percentage which is calculated as equity/total pension assets. Table 5 Regression Analysis Managerial Choice and Conservatism Table 5 presents the results for fixed effects regressions for the determinants of the pension assumptions and managerial conservatism. The table presents the regression coefficient and immediately below is the corresponding t-statistic. * indicates significant at 95% and ** indicates significance at 90%. The dependent variable for each model is presented at the head of each column and the independent variables are presented in the far left column. Size is measured by the log market value the market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity/book value of equity, debt-to-equity is total debt/market value of equity. Surplus to Total Assets is the pension surplus (deficit)/ Total Assets, funding is measured by pension assets/pension liabilities and the equity percentage which is calculated as equity/total pension assets. 
